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[L. A. No. 23105. In Bank. Oct. 15, 1954.]

Adoption of PATRICIA McDONALD, a Minor. EDNA !'II
JAMES, Respondent, v. HOLY FAMILY ADOPTIO;\
SERVICE, Appellant.
[1] Adoption-Origin of Right.-The procedure for adoption. llll
known at common law, is entirely statutory.
[2] Id.-Proceedings-Consent.-By virtue of Civ. Code. § 2~1.
rules controlling adoption of any minor child are "rules pre·
scribed in this chapter" (chap. 2 of div. 1, pt. 3, tit. 2) not rules
of any department or agency, and no provision in such chapter
makes consent of anyone other than natural parent indispensable to granting of an adoption.
[3] Id.-Proceedings-Consent-Parents.-A legitimate ehild cannot be adopted without consent of parents if living, and an
illegitimate child cannot be adopted without consent of mother,

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d., Adoption of Children, § 2; Am.Jur., Adoption
of Children, § 3.
(2) See Cal.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 20 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Adoption of Children, § 35 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Adoption, § 2; [2] Adoption, § 21;
[3,6,7] Adoption, § 22; [4] Adoption §§ 22, 26.5; [5,12] Adoption,
§ 14; [8,9,11] Adoption, § 13; [10,13,14] Adoption, § 26.1; [15-18]
Adoption, § 26.5; [19J Adoption, § 5; [20J Adoption, § 7; [21]
Adoption, § 15.
• Aasigned by Chairm&D of Judicial CounciL
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if living, 11111,.,.;>\ fllt.hor or lDothrl' hall heen .indi(·jlll1y deprived
(If rlll"tody (lr rhild, hn.!! tleRl'rt.p.r\ rhild withont provision for

its identifirlltion, hRS relinquii<hed child for ndoptioD pursuant
to Civ. Code, § 224m, or has been declared by court of COIDpetent jurisdiction to be feeble-minded or insane. (Civ. Code,
1224.)
[4] Id. - Proceedings - Oonsent - Parents: Licensed Agency.Under Civ. Code, § 224, relating to consent of parents to
adoption, only consent required for adoption of illegitimate
child is consent of mother, and her consent is not required
when she has relinquished child for adoption; there is no provision requiring consent of agency to which child has been
relinquished for adoption.
[5] Id.-Proceedings-Petition.-Civ. Code, 1226, par. 1, declaring
that any person desiring to adopt a child may petition superior
court of county in which petitioner resides, does not except a
relinquished child or any other child, and does not authorize
that petition be made to State Department of Social Welfare,
a licensed county agency, or any private agency licensed by
such department.
[8] Id.-Proceedings-Oonsent-Parenta.-Civ. Code, § 226, par.
1, declaring that in cases in which consent to adoption is required, unless agency licensed by State Department of Social
Welfare to place children in homes for adoption joins in petition for adoption, consent of natural parent or parents to adoption must be signed in presence of agent of such department
or of licensed county adoption agency on a form prescribed by
such department, can only apply to children who have not been
abandoned, relinquished or taken from custody of their parents, since parental consent is not required for adoption of
luch children.
[7] Id.-Proceedings-Consent-Parents.-"Such consent," as used
in Civ. Code, § 226, par. 2, declaring it shall, when acknowledged before authorized agent, be prima facie evidence of
right of person making it to sole eustody of child and such
person's sole right to consent, refers to parental consent mentioned in first paragraph, and does not apply to relinquished
children.
[8] Id.-Proceedings-Dutiea of State Department or County
Adoption Agency.-Duty of State Department of Social Welfare or county adoption agency to ascertain whether child is
proper subject for adoption and whether proposed home is
luitable, as required by Civ. Code, § 226, par. 3, applies to Ill!
eases of adoption (except stepparent adoptions), including
eases of abandoned or relinquished children.
[9] Id. - Proceedings - Duties of Licensed Agency.-When an
agency licensed to place children for adoption is a pnl'ty to
petition for adoption of a child, U ill &&awned that it will
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take place of Stale ""part-nll'l1t of Soci;]i \V"lfnre or t'ollnt~
adoption agency and pcrforlu duty ilp\£'gat!'d to it by dcpnrt·
ment of ascertaining whether child is prop"!' subject for adoption and proposed home suitable for child. (Welf. & lnst.
Code, § 1620.)
[10] Id.-Proceedings - Consent - State Department or County
Adoption Agency.-Civ. Code, § 226, par. 4, relating to consent
of State Dcpartmcnt of Social Welfare or county adoption
agency to adoption, expressly places on such department or
county agency the duty to give or withhold consent when
parental consent is not required and a licensed agency is not
a party, but does not authorize giving or withholding consent
by a licensed agency when it is a party.
[11] Id.-Proceedings-Report and Recommendation of State De·
partment or County Adoption Agency.-Duty of State Depart·
ment of Social Welfare or county adoption agency to submit
to court a full report of facts disclosed by itll. inquiry with
respect to whether child is proper subject for adoption and
proposed home suitable for child, with recommendation re·
garding granting of petition for adoption, as required by Civ.
Code, § 226, par. 5, was not waived where county agency filed
report and recommendation that petition be denied.
[12] Id.-Proceedings-Petition-Recommendation to Deny Peti·
tion.-Civ. Code, § 226, par. 7, declaring that if State Depart.
ment of Social Welfare or county adoption agency recom·
mends that petition for adoption be denied, county clerk shall
refer such report to superior court for review, applies to all
adoption cases (except stepparent adoptions) and does not
except cases of abandoned, relinquished or other children, but
no purpose would be served by such review if court were with·
out power to grant an adoption without consent of a licensed
agency.
[13a, l3b] Id.-Proceedings - Consent - State Department or
County Adoption Agency.-Civ. Code, § 226, par. 11, declaring
that after filing of findings by State Department of Social
Welfare court may "if it deems that the welfare of the child
will be promoted by said adoption, allow the signing of the
eonsent by the natural parent or parents in open court, or if
the appeal be from the refusal of said department or agency
to consent thereto, grant the petition without such consent,"
expressly places in superior court the final decision as to
whether or not adoption shall be granted when department or
county agency refuses its consent. (Disnpproving In
Kitchens, 116 Cnl.App.2d 254, 253 P.2d 690.)
[14] Id. - Proceedings - Consent - State Department or County
Adoption Agency.-Although Civ. Code, ~ 226, par. 11, ~pr:1ks
of an "appeal" from refusal of State Department of Social
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\V.-J r;,,· .. or ('''Illity adopt.ion 1lg"('II('Y ... (~(III~('lIt t(l IIdoption ul'
('hil.l, '·11"1"1' is no provision for an.v hcnl'inl; hrfor!' sll('h dl'partll1('nt or county agpney, nnd sueh "apP('Itl" dol's not prescribe any furthl'r procedurul steps when mntter is already
heforl' the conrt on prtition or for review.
[151 Id. - Proceedings - Consent - Licensed Agency.-Since
superior court cun grant an adoption without ('onsent of Rtntl'
Departmcnt of Social Welfare or county adoption agency.
a fortiori it can do "0 without conspnt of Ii(,pnf;pd privatI'
agency.
[16] Id.-Proceedings-Consent - Licensed Agency.-The agency
to which a child is relinquished for adoption doe" not acquire
through such relinquishment right of natural parent. under
Civ. Code. ~ 224. to withhold consent to adoption.
[17] Id. - Proceedings - Consent - Licensed Agency.-Right of
natural parent to refuse consent to adoption is based on natural
affection between parent and child, and same affection is not
present when child has been relinquished to agency for adoption.
[18] Id. - Proceedings - Consent - Licensed Agency.-Fact that
agency to which child is relinquished for adoption acquires,
subject to authority and supervision of State Department of
Social Welfare (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1620, 1621), legal
custody of child (see Civ. Code § 224n, which was added to code
in 1953) does not preclude adoption without such agency's
consent.
[19] Id.-Construction of Sta.tutes.-Wherever possible, such construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather
than defeat. object they have in view.
[20] Id.-Proceedings-Who May Adopt.-Neither State Department of Social Welfare, county adoption agency, nor any
private agency has power hy regulation or by agreement to
deprive person with whom a child has been placed for possible
adoption of right to petition superior court for adoption of
such child and have court determine whether petition should
or should not be granted.
[21] Id.-Proceedings-Agreement.-In proceeding for adoption of
child, child is real party in interest, its welfare controls, and
any agreement others may have made for its custody is subject
to court's independent judgment as to what is for best interests
of child.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Allg('les County granting petition for adoption. Paul Nourse,
J uuge. Affirmed.

AI>OI'TW:-I (/I<' l\'lcDuNAI,D
14:; C 2d "'7, 274

P.~rl

RnD:

Herman F. Selvin, Clock, Waestman & Cloe)" Locb & Loeb
and Edward W. Sheridan for Appellant.
Elsie M. Farris and Elizabeth Cochran for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-The Holy Family Adoption Service (here·
inafter called Holy Family), a licensed adoption agency.
appeals from an order granting the petition of Mrs. Edna M .
.fames to adopt an illegitimate child known as Patricia
.HcDonald.
Th~ llatural mother of the child duly relinquished it for
adoption to Holy Family pursuant to Civil Code, section 224m.
Within three weeks after its birth Holy Family placed it with
Mrs .•James and her husband, who at that time signed an agreement to accept the child upon the conditions stated therein.
Under the agreement the child was placed on a one-year probationary basis; any request for adoption had to be approved
by an authorized officer of the agency; the agency placed the
child with the intention and full expectation of leaving the
child in the home; if after one year the agency was "fully
satisfied with the care and training of the child, and character of the home" and approveo a request therefor, adoption
would be permitted; and the agency had "the right to remove
the child previous to legal adoption if at any time the
circumstances made it necessary to do 80." (Italics added.)
About eight months after the placement of the child, Mr.
J ames committed suicide. Sometime thereafter the agency
demanded that the child be returned to it for placement elsewhere. Mrs .•James refused and filed the petition herein to :
adopt the child. Pursuant to section 226 of the Civil Code the
Los Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, the licensed county
adoption agency, filed its report and recommendation that the
petition be denied and the child returned to Holy Family on
the ground that it was not legally free for adoption since
Holy Family refused to consent thereto. Petitioner appealed
to the court under section 226 of the Civil Code and the county
agency and Holy Family were cited to appear and show cause
why the child should not be declared free from thcir control.
The trial court concluded that the consent of Holy Family
was not necessary and found on substantial evidence that it
is for the b~st interests of the child that the petition be
grantc!l, that it would be injurious to the child to take it
from Mrs. James at its present age and return it to institutional care and thereafter further placement, that the child is
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suitable for adoption, that Mrs. James is a suitable and proper
person to adopt the child, and that her home is a suitable homt>
for the child.
The basic question on this appeal is whether the court could
g-rant the adoption without the consent of Holy Family.
[1] The answer to this question lies in the interpretation of
the statutes governing adoptions in effect at the time the order
herein was entered,· (Civ. Code, §§ 221, 224, 224m, 226) for
the procedure for adoption, unknown at common law, i~
entirely statutory. (Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265, 268 [196
P.2d 1]; In "e Santos, 185 Cal. 127, 129 [195 P. 1055].)
Appellant contends that under these sections a relillqui!1hecl
child cannot be adopted without the consent of the 1Ig'f'lH'Y
to which it has been relinquished for adoption.
Appellant concedes that there is no express provision i i:
these sections requiring that consent, but contends that such
a requirement is necessarily implied therein. We haye con
eluded not only that no requirement of such consent call
reasonably be implied from these sections but that the court
is expressly empowered thereunder, if it deems the welfaT!'
of the child will be promoted by the adoption, to grant the
petition without such consent. This conclusion is compelled
by the plain language of thcse sections, as the following
analysis thereof will make evident.
[2] " Any minor child may be adopted by any adult person, in the cases and subject to the rules prescribed in this
chapter!' (Civ. Code, § 221.) The controlling rules are the
"rules prescribed in this chapter," not the rules of any department or agency, public or private. Nowhere "in this chapter"
can any provision be found that makes the consent of anYOllP
other than a natural parent indispensable to the granting of
an adoption.
.
[3] A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the CODsent of its parents, if living (under certain circumstances not
pertinent here, the mother alone may consent), and an illegitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of its
mother, if living, unless such father or mother (1) has been
judicially deprived of custody of the child; (2) has deserted
the child without provision for its identification; (3) has relinquished the child for adoption pursuant to Civil Code section
224m; or (4) has been declared by a court of competent juris-The 1953 amendments to these sections are not pcrtinent here and
woul:1 not nfl'ect the result hercin, even if they had been in effeet at

the tim, the ordu waa entered.
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.iil-Hon to be feeble·minded or illlllllle. (Civ. Code, § 224.)
[4] Under this section the only COllsent required for the
adoption of an illegitimate child is the consent of the mother,
and her consent is not required when she has relinquished the
child for adoption. Not only is there no provision in this
section requiring any consent of the agency to which the child
has been relinquished for adoption, but the Legislature in
its 1953 session refused to enact an amendment thereto that
"A child relinquished for adoption cannot be adopted without
the consent of the agency to which the child has been relinquished. "
If there is any implication in the statutes that the licensed
agency to which a child has been relinquished for adoption
must consent to the adoption, it mnst be found in Civil Codt'
section 226, which sets forth the procedure by which an adop·
tion can be accomplished. A careful examination of each paragraph thereof fails to disclose any such implication.
[6] The tirst paragraph of that section provides:
" Any person desiring to adopt a child may for that purpose
petition the superior court of the county in which the peti.
tioner resides and the clerk of the court shall immediately
notify the State Department of Social We!fare at Sacramento
in writing of the pendency of the action and of any subsequent
action taken."
Note that the right to petition does not except a relinquished
ehild or any other child. Note further that the petition is to
t.he Superior Oourt and not to the State Department of Social
Welfare (hereinafter called the department), a licensed
cOtlnty agency, or any private agency licensed by the department.
[6] This paragraph continues:
"In aU cases in which consent is required, except in the case
of an adoption by a stepparent where one natural or adoptive
parent retains his or her custody and control of the child,
unless an agency licensed by the State Department of Social
Welfare to tind homes for children and place children in homes
for adoption joins in the petition for adoption, the consent of
the natnral parent or parents to the adoption by the peti.
tioners must be signed in the presence of an agent of the
State Department of Social We}fare or of a licensed county
adoption agency on a form prescribed by such department
and filed with the clerk of the superior court, in the county
of the petitioner's residence. "

4G4
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'PhI' only consent to which this langungl' ('an apply is par
Pilla! ('onsent, for the only purpose of this patt of the para-

)

graph is to prescribe th(' procedure by which parents may
give their consent. It can only apply to children who haw
not been abandoned, relinquished, or taken from the custody
of their parents, for parental consent is not required for the
adoption of such children. It assumes that a petition may be
filed for the adoption of a child who has not been relinquished
but who has been placed for adoption by a licenscd adoption
agency by providing that if the agency joins in the petition,
the consent of the natural parent need not be signed on the
prescribed form in the presence of an agent of the department
or county agency.
[7] The second paragraph provides:
"Such consent, when reciting that the person giving it is
entitled to the sole custody of the minor child, shall, when duly
acknowledged before such agent, be prima facie evidence of
the right of the person making it to the sole custody of the
child and such person's sole right to consent."
"Such consent" as herein used refers to the parental consent mentioned in the first paragraph and does not apply to
relinquished children for the same reasons that paragraph
does not.
[8] The third paragraph provides:
"In all cases of adoption in which no agency licensed to
place children for adoption is a party, except in the case of
an adoption by a stepparent where one natural or adoptiYe
parent retains his or her custody and control of the said child,
it shall be the duty of the Department of Social Welfare or
of the licensed county adoption agency to accept the consent
of the natural parents to the adoption of the child by the
petitioners and to ascertain whether the child is
proper
subject for adoption and whether the proposed home is suitable for the child, prior to filing report with the court."
The duty to ascertain whether the child is a proper subject for adoption, and the proposed home suitable, applies to
all cases of adoption (except stepparent adoptions), including
cases of abandoned or relinquished children. The only effect
of the paragraph, when an agency licensed to place children
for adoption is a party, is to relieve the department or the
county agency of that duty, [9] When such an agency is 11
party, it is assumed that it will take the place of the department or county agency and perform the duty delegated to
it by the department of ascertaining whether the child is

a
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a proper subject for adoption and the proposed borne suitable
for the child. (Welf. & lnllt. Code, § 1620.)
[10] The fourth paragraph provides:
"In all cases in which the consent of the natural parent
or parents is not necessary and an agency licensed to place
children for adoption is not a party to the petition. the
State Department of Social Welfare or the licensed county
adoption agency shall, prior to the bearing of the petition.
file its consent to the adoption with the clerk of the snperior
court of the county in which the petitiolJ is filed. Such
consent shall not be given by the Department of Social Welfare or the licensed county adoption agency unless the child's
welfare will be promoted by the adoption."
The duty is here expressly placed on the department or
the county agency to give or withhold consent when parental
consent is not required and a licensed agency is not a party.
There is no provision for giving or withholding consent by a
licensed agency when it is a party. In the absence of such
a provision it would appear that it has no authority under
this paragraph to give or withhold consent. It might reasonably be contended, however, that just as it takes the place
of the department or county agency with respect to the dnties
imposed under the third paragraph, it takes their place here
and has the same power to give or withhold consent. But
even if this contention were accepted, it cannot reasonably
be assumed that the licensed agency (which is only licensed
from year to year and may have its license revoked. Welf.
& Inst. Code. §§ 1623, 1625) has greater power than the
agencies whose place it takes (particularly the department.
which licenses and regnlates it) and that its consent to the
adoption is indispensable even though. as will appear in
our rliscussion of the eleventh paragraph. the consent of the
department or county agency is not indispensable.
[11] The fifth paragraph provides:
"Except in the case of the adoption of a child by a stepparent where one natural or adoptive parent retains his or
her custody and control of the child, it shall be the duty of
the Department of Social Welfare or of the licenspo county
adoption agency to submit to the court a fuB report of the
facts disclo'led by its inquiry fmade under the third paragraph 1 with a recommf'nclation regarfling the granting of the
petitiol1 within 180 (la:vs aflf'r the filil1g of the petit.ion; providf'G. hO\w"er. that HlP eonrt PH1" allow slH'h a/lrlitional timf'
for the filing of said report as in its discretion it may see

456
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fit. The report required of the D~pnrtmellt of Social WeI.
fare or of the licensed county adoption agency may br wah-p,d
by the department in all cases in which an a~r(,ll:'y licens('d
by the Department of Social Welfare to placc {~hildrelJ in
homes for adoption, is a party or joins in the pct.ition for
adoption. Such waiver may be issued by the department at
any time, either before or after the filing of the petition for
adoption. "
This paragraph, like the third, applies to all cases of adoption (except stepparent adoptions) including the adoption
of abandoned or relinquished children. Here again, as in
the third paragraph, if the report required by the depart.
ment or the county agency is waived because a licensed agency
is a party or joins in the petition, it is assumed that the
licensed agency takes the place of the department or licensed
county agency and will ascertain whether the child is a proper
subject for adoption and the proposed home suitable for the
chUd and present to the court the results of its inquiry and
its recommendation. In the present ease the report and
recommendation required of the department or county agency
\vas not waived, for the county agency filed a report and
recommendation that the petition be denied.
[12] The seventh- paragraph provides:
"If the findings of the State Department of Social WeI·
fare or the county adoption agency are that the home of the
petitioners is not suitable for the child and it recommentl!!
that the petition be denied, the county clerk upon receipt of
the report of the State Department of Social Welfare or the
county adoption agency shall immediately refer it to the
superior court for review." (Italics added.)
This paragraph also applies to all adoption cases (except
stepparent adoptions) and does not except cases of abandoned,
relinquished, or other children. Note that the clerk must
immediately refer an adverse report to the superior court
for rMew. If the court were without power to grant an
adoption without the consent of 8 licensed agency, as it is
,vithout such power when parental consent is required. no
purpose would be served by a review-the report and recommendations would be immaterial whether or not they were
-The sixth paragraph merely provides that a copy ot the report by
the department or county agt'ney must be given to the attorney for the
petitioner or thl' petit.ioner. If a licensed ageney is a party, it is RS·
sumed that through the rll'niling~ nnd evidence the petitioner and his
attorney will get the results of the agenc;,'. inquir;y and the r<!asons
for ita coneluBioDl.

)
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rf':lsollahle, arbitrary or eapricions, just as they would h"
immaterial if parental consent were required and it was refused. In the present case, following the adverse report of
the county agency, the matter was referred for review in
compliance with this paragraph and that agency and the
Holy Family were cited to appear and show cause why the
ehild should not be declared free from their control.
[13a] The eleventht paragraph provides:
"If for a period of 180 days from the date of tiling the
petition, or upon the expiration of any extension of said
period granted by the court, the Department of Social Welfare or the licensed county adoption agency fails or refuses
to accept the consent of the natural parent or parents to the
adoption, or if said department or agency fails or refuses to
file or give its consent to an adoption in those cases where
its consent is required by this chapter, either the natural
parent or parents or the petitioner may appeal from such
failure or refusal to the superior court of the county in which
the petition is tiled, in which event the clerk shall immediately
notify the Department of Social Welfare of such appeal and
the department or agency shall within 10 days tile a report
of its findings and the reasons for its failure or refusal to
consent to the adoption or to accept the consent of the natural
parent. After the tiling of said findings, the court may,
if it deems that the welfare of the cht1d will be promoted
by said adoptwn, allow the signing of the consent by the
natural parent or parents in open court, or if the appeal be
from the refusal of said department or agency to consent
thereto, grant the petition without suck cOllsent." (Italics
added.)
In clear, precise language this paragraph places in the
Superior Court the tinal decision as to whether or not an
adoption shall be granted when the department or county
agency refuses its consent. "The court may, if it deems the
welfare of the child will be promoted by the adoption • • .
grant the petition without such consent." In the present case the county agency tiled its report and recommendation that the petition be denied and petitioner appealed.
Under the plain language of the seventh paragraph the matter was before the court for review, and under the plain
language of the eleventh paragraph the court had power to
grant the adoption without the consent of such agency.
tThe eiihth, Dinth, &ad tenth parairapha are not pertineJlt her..

)
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[14] Although this paragraph spruks of lUI "appeal," tbere
is no provisioll for any hearing before the department. the
county agency, or any other agcncy and there is no reason to
believe that thc word .. appeal" prescribes any further pro·
cedural steps when the matter is already before the court on
the petition, or for review under the seventh paragraph.
Nor can it reasonably be implied from this paragraph
that since department or agency consent was not require!)
because a licensed agency was a party, the court was without
power to grant the petition without its consent. As we have
shown above, no provision is made for consent by any public
or private agency other than the department or county agency,
and their refusal to consent is subject to review. If a requirement of consent by a licensed private agency can be implied
at all when it is a party, it can only be because it takes the
place of the department or county agency under· the fourth
paragraph; if it takes such place it is subject to the same
limitations to which they are subject. [15] Since the court
can grant an adoption without the consent of the department or county agency, a fortiori it can do so wit.hout the
consent of a licensed private agency.
[lSb] In re Kitchens, 116 Cal.App.2d 254 [253 P.2d 690].
on which appellant relies, reads into the statute matters that
are not there and fails to give effect to express provisions that
are there. It would divest the superior court of the jurisdiction and responsibility expressly given it by the statutes
and is therefore disapproved.
No distinction is made in the statutes as to procedure,
consent, or power of the court, between adoptions of abandoned, relinquished, or other children when a licensed agency
is a party. Nor is there anything therein that limits the
right of a licensed agency to place children for adoption to
those relinquished to it. In Adoption of D.S., 107 Cal.App.
2d 211 [236 P.2d 821], in which the department refused its
consent to the adoption of an abandoned child. it was held
that under section 226 of the Civil Code the court exercises
its independent judgment and can grant an adoption without the consent of the department. No one contends that the
consent of a private agency licensed by the department would
be indispensable in such a case, and there is no more reason
for making it indispensable in the case of the adoption of a
relinquished child.
[16] Appellant contends that the agency to which a child
is relinquished for adoption acquires through the relinquish-

)
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mt-llt all of t!!P- rights of a natural parent, including the right
II nller 8ectiol1 224 to withhold consent to an adoption. Neither
section 224, 224m, nor any other statute so provides. The only
consent other than parental consent required by the statutes
is that of the department or the county agency, which. as we
have seen. is subject to review. The consent of thesp public
ngencies. or of a lic<.'rtsed private agency. cannot be equated
with parental consent. [17] The right of a natural parent
to refuse consent is based on the natural affection between
parent and child. As stated in Matter of Cozza. 163 Cal.
514. 523 [126 P. 161. Ann.Cas. 1914A 214]. "the law. recognizing the natural and sacred rights of natural parents to
thl"ir children. will permit [adoption) only with the consent
of the parents. . . ." Manifestly the same "natural and
sacred rights" are not present when a child has been relinquished to an agency for adoption. [18] At most the
agency acquires, subject to the authority and supervision of
the department (Welf. & lnst. Code. §§ 1620. 1621). the I('~al
custody of the child (see Civ. Code, § 224n. which was arlderl
to the code in 1953.) But that would not preclude adoption
without its consent. [n In re Santos, 185 Cal. 127 [195 P.
1055], the guardian had legal custody of the child. yet thitt
court held that since there was no provision in the statutes
reqniring his consent and no reason to imply sueh a requirement, the trial court had power to grant the petition to adopt
the child without his ('onsent. [19] "Wherever possible.
such a construction should be given adoption laws as will
sustain, rather than defeat. the object they have in view.
(E.~tate of McKeag, 141 Cal. 403 [74 P. 1039,99 Am.St.Rep.
80]. ) The main purpose of adoption statutes is the
promotion of the welfare of childen, bereft of the benefits
of the home and care of their real parents. by the legal
recognition and regulation of the consummation of the closest
conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent anrl
child. While a guardian of the person of a minor is charged
with a high duty and serious respon!!ibility in the ('are of hi~
ward, nevertheless the status of guardian and wa.rd falls Rhort
of thf> close approximation to the relationship of parent an ..1
chilo whieh is attainable through aetnal adoption culminating.
as it does, in the rhild hecoming a member. to all intent!! a.nd
purpo!!e!!. of thE' family of the foster parents. The statute!!
in qnestion should not. thf>rf>forf>. hI' ('onstruE'!d so as to f>Xelude an orphan in the custody of a guardian from the realiza-
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tion of the peculiar advantages to be derived from an adoption unless such construction be unavoidable.
"While the code sections above mentioned do not expressly
refer to such a situation as is here prcsented, they do, in
effect, by the generality of their language, authorize an adoption in such a case. They provide that any minor child may
be adopted by any adult person, in the cases and subject to
the limitations set forth in the chapter. The' cases' referred to
are clearly these situations where the prescribed differences in
ages exists and the requisite consent is obtainable. There is
no attempt to limit the privilege of adoption according to
the legal relationship of the minor and the pcrson who has
him in custody at the time of the adoption proceedings. [n
view of the fact that adoption is sanctioned where the parents
of the child are living and not disqualified from exercising
their parental rights, there can be no reason for implying a
restriction merely because there is a duly appointed and quali.
fied guardian." .(185 Cal. at 130-131.) In Ex parte Chambers.
80 Cal. 216 [22 P. 138], on which appellant relies. the statute
provided: "The managers of the several orphan asylums in
this state are hereby authorized and empowered to consent to
the adoption of any orphan child, or child abanrlonE'd by it!;
parents, in the same manner that parents are by law ualhorized to consent to the adoption of their children." (Italic!'
added.) No snch provision can be found in the statutes of this
state today.
Appellant contends, however, that unless the consent of the
licensed agency is made a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
adoption of a relinquished child, the statutory provisions
(Civ. Code, §§ 224p, 224q; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1629) vesting
in licensed adoption agencies the exclusive function of placing
children for adoption will be subverted. Those statutes were
followed here. The child was placed with petitioner and her
husband by a licensed adoption agency, and through the report
of the county agency and the evidence presented by Holy
Family the court had the bellt~:;( :If their facilities, training,
experience, and ad vice. Not only is there nothing in
the statutes cited to indicate that the home-finding function
given to licensed adoption agencies gives them and not the
court the final decision as to whether or not an adoption is
for the best interests of the child, but in section 226 of the
Civil Code. the Legislature in clear and express language
vested that power and respolhibility in the snpt>riol' ('onrt.
[20] Appellant also contends that petitioner is estopped
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----------------------------------------------hy the agreement shr and her husuand signrd at the time the
('hild was placed in thC':r h0t!~C'

'rhr rgl'eCllwut was prescribed
by the regulations of 1 he deparlmen t. which is authorized to
make regulations governing the placement of children by
licensed agencies. (Welf. & lnst. Coue, § 1621.) The department, however, has no power by regulation or otherwise to
add to or detract from the rules for adoption prescribed in
the Civil Code. (See discussion of Civ. Code § 221, supra;
Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Ca1.2d 753.
757 [151 P.2d 233. 155 A.L.R. 405].) Thus, neither appellant, the department. the county agency, nor any private
agency had the right by regulation or by agreement to deprive
petitioner of the right granted her by section 226 of the Civil
Code to petition the court and have the court determine
whether the petition should or should not be granted. If the
department could give a licensed agency the right to control
the adoption of a relinquished child, it could give such an
agency the right to control the adoption of any child not
subject to parental control. The statutory provisions governing adoptions cannot be so circumvented.
[21] In a proceeding such as this the child is the real party
in interest and is not a party to any agreement. It is the
welfare of the c!lild that controls, and any agreement others
lllay have made for its custody is made subject to the court's
independent judgment as to what is for the best interests
of the child. (Van der Vliet v. Van der Vliet, 200 Cal. 721,
722 [254 P. 945] ; Anderson v. Anderson, 56 Cal.App. 87, 89
(204 P. 426].)
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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